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ABSTRACT
FRAMING CLIMATE CHANGE AS NATIONAL SECURITY:
A SURVEY-EXPERIMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE PERCEPTIONS
Adam Lyons
November 30, 2018
The issues surrounding climate change continue to have polarizing effects on many
Americans. In this thesis I offer a potential bridge to this divide with a comprehensive
study on how issue frames can impact how individuals shape their opinions on
environmental issues. Focusing on a national security frame, I ask the central research
“Will the public perceive issues of climate change differently when they are framed as
threats to national security?” For this thesis I design an original experimental survey to
measure the impact security framing has on participants’ perception of both climate
change and environmental policy options. The survey was designed using Qualtrics
online survey software and I recruited participants using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
crowd-sourced labor platform. I use data from this original framing experiment to show
that exposure to a national security frame does, indeed, affect perceptions on
environmental issues and raise support for environmental policies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

As the debate over climate change continues to divide Americans, primarily along
partisan lines, media messaging and the framing strategies used may be partially
responsible for this division. After rebranding “global warming” to the more
comprehensive term of “climate change,” advocates on both sides of the climate change
debate have used varying policy frames to define the narrative environmental problems,
or the lack of problems, to align with policies that further their political agendas. One
frame that seems to be gaining steam among policy actors and the media is to portray the
dire effects of climate change as an issue of national security. Environmental advocates
and military leaders are in near agreement that disaster-mitigating policies are necessary
for the protection of both national and international security. Placing a security frame on
issues related to climate change has been a strategy used in the highest level of American
government. What was once a pillar of the Obama administration’s National Security
Strategy, the Trump administration omitted climate change as a threat to national security
when they issued their first National Security Strategy in January 2017.1 This shift in the
executive-level framing of climate change provides numerous research opportunities to

1

For the Obama Administration National Security Strategy see:
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf,
For the Trump Administration National Security Strategy see: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
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examine how the framing of climate change issues by media outlets, politicians, and
interest groups affect public perceptions. Does the public perceive issues of climate
change as more severe when they are framed as threats to national security? Does public
support government action on climate change increase when policy options are framed as
necessities for maintaining national security? These two questions, together, comprise the
central research question this thesis seeks to address.
To answer these questions, I design an original framing experiment that randomly
assigns a large N, crowdsourced sample to read one of two news excerpts prior to
answering questions related to climate change, national security, and policy. The
treatment excerpt frames climate change as an issue of national security, while the control
excerpt contains no framing, outside of the original article from which the excerpt is
taken. The literature reviewed in this thesis provides a strong theoretical foundation to
build predictions on the likely results this experiment may report.
Issues surrounding climate change have been contentious and publicly polarizing
since they first landed on the public agenda (Dunlap and McCright 2011). The
mobilization of both environmental advocacy groups and corporate interests (McCright
and Dunlap 2000) and coordinated efforts in casting blame when an environmental
disaster occurs (Merry 2014) have been successful strategies in rallying support bases and
shaping public opinions of climate change. However, these efforts are likely adding to an
already hyper-polarized issue. This thesis seeks a possible bridge to this divide by
offering research on a frame that may reduce the polarizing effects of climate change. If
the participants of this study react positively to the security frame, they may be more
likely to change their perception of climate change as a matter of national security.
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Moreover, if the security frame changes perceptions of climate change it may have the
additional effect of increasing action on policy options.
The layout of this thesis is designed to provide a comprehensive coverage of the
relevant social science literature, the experimental design and methods used for data
collection, and how the data were analyzed. Chapter II reviews the relevant social science
literature, such as policy issue framing and problem definition theory, media choice,
environmental and national security public opinion, and public policy agenda setting. I
discuss how each area of research builds a theoretical foundation for this thesis. Chapter
III provides a brief overview of public opinion on environmental issues captured in the
2016 American National Election Study (ANES). A series a data tables examine views on
environmental issues from respondents across the political spectrum. Chapter IV outlines
the research design and method and measurement this thesis deploys to test the
hypotheses introduced in this chapter. The use of a survey experiment, the digital survey
software Qualtrics, and Amazon’s online labor force for recruiting survey participants
(“MTURK”) are also examined. Chapter V presents a series of statistical models that test
the effects of the framing experiment on a large N, randomly assigned sample. This thesis
concludes with a final chapter, Chapter VI, that discusses the implications of this study
and opportunities for future research based on the findings presented in this thesis.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides a review of the literature used to develop the theoretical
framework of this thesis. First, I discuss the theory of issue framing and its effects on
influencing individual attitudes. Next, I examine research on the attitudes on
environmental policies and the factors that contribute to these attitudes. Similar to the
review on environmental policies, I then examine literature on attitudes toward national
security with a particular emphasis on the public’s attitude of importance in security
issues. I then review recent research showing the connection between environmental
issues and national security. Finally, I review policy agenda setting literature with an
emphasis on policy framing and narratives. Following this review, I formally state and
justify my primary hypotheses.
Issue Framing Theory
Issue frames are both common and essential communications strategies that
organize everyday reality into succinct narratives (Tuchman 1978). Recent research into
the effects of media issue framing on individual attitudes has focused on the ways in
which the media play a role in the construction of reality (McQuail 1994; Scheufele
1999). In a time where information consumers have seemingly endless amounts of media
outlets to choose from, media is becoming increasingly tailored to fit an individual’s
political ideology and social preferences, often without the consumer’s knowledge
4

(Drotner, 2005). The public can now consume media that is only relevant to them and
ignore what is not. This combination of the media’s ability to construct reality and
personalized news and information sources leads individuals toward a reality that is built
not just on personal experiences and interactions with peers, but on their interpretations
of the media they have consumed (Drotner, 2005; Keeter, 1993; Scheufele, 1999).
Media outlets, politicians and advocacy groups are at an advantage when they
frame stories in a way that garners a lot of public attention. These policy actors often
focus on high-stakes issues, as they are believed to be the most newsworthy, all of which
leads to increased viewership and exposure (Bennett, 1996; Boydston & Glazier, 2013;
Gans 2004). This leads media outlets to frame stories in a more negative or loss frame
than a positive or gain frame and thus sensationalizing the story (Boydston & Glazier,
2013; Sheafer, 2007). This practice represents the media strategy of “if it bleeds, it leads”
when deciding on which stories to run. In addition to loss versus gain media framing,
media outlets have seen increase viewership when stories are framed in such a way that
plays off an individual’s fear (Boydston & Glazier, 2013; Gans, 2004;
Iyengar, 1991, 1996).
Additional research on media and public opinion has shown that news headlines
alone can have a powerful effect on the attitudes people adopt on issues by providing
cognitive shortcuts, or heuristics, (Allport & Lepkin, 1943; Geer & Kahn, 1993; Pfau,
1995; Smith & Fowler, 1982; Tannenbaum,1953) even when there is considerable
dissonance between the headline and its corresponding story (Andrew, 2007). I utilize
these findings in the design of the survey experiment by providing the treatment group
with a national security frame in the headline, as well as the body.
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This research on media and the strategic use of issue frames builds the position of
this thesis that a national security frame on climate change will affect the public’s
perception on climate change’s impacts. Obviously, issues of national security rank fairly
high in sensationalism, making such a frame advantageous for media outlets, politicians,
and issue advocacy groups. Furthermore, for an issue to be immune to the barriers
established with personalized media sources and crowd-sourced social media, issues will
likely have to take on frames that invoke fear or play off other national anxieties. A
national security frame on climate change may produce such an effect.
Environmental Attitudes and Media Frames
Media communications specific to environmental policies are often framed as
achievement of gains or avoidance of losses; individuals can make radical choices when
they are presented with the opposing frame (Bertolotti & Catellani, 2014; Gifford &
Comeau, 2011; Reber & Berger, 2005). In particular, media frames that suggest the
achievement of a high level of gains predict an increase in support for environmental
policies (Bertolotti & Catellani, 2014; Morton, Rabinovich, Marshall, & Bretschneider,
2011). It is my intention to frame environmental policy in this same manner, of gains vs
losses, but with the added focus on national security implications.
Additional research suggests that conservatives are, in general, less concerned
about the environment and are less likely to support pro-environment policies than liberal
leaning individuals (Abramowitz, 1980; Dunlap & McCright, 2000, 2011; McCright,
Dunlap, & Marquart-Pyatt, 2016). However, this lack of environmental concern is more
particular to American conservatives than their international conservatives (McCright,
Dunlap, & Marquart-Pyatt, 2016). Conservatives in other Western countries such as the
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UK, Canada, and Australia have historically lacked similar negative views on climate
change (Brechin, 2010; Leiserowitz, 2008). In America, generally the most consistent
predictors of environmental support are political ideology and party identification
(Konisky, Milyo, & Richardson, 2008). Additionally, research shows that proenvironmental populations such as the young, racial minorities, and the well-educated,
are not typically associated with the Republican Party or conservative ideology, whereas
more religious individuals tend to be less supportive (Carman, 1998; Guth, Green,
Kellstedt, & Smidt, 1995; Kanagy, Humphrey, & Firebaugh, 1994; Klineberg, McKeever
& Rothenbach, 1998; Konisky el al, 2008; Dunlap & McCright, 2011; Xiao & Dunlap
2007). This research suggests that the framing experiment employed in this thesis may
have profound effects across political ideology, especially if the frame is able to raise
support among populations where it traditionally lacks. Chapter III goes a bit further in
explaining the political polarization surrounding environmental issues by presenting
political descriptive statistics on environmental support.
While a security frame has yet to be tested, the use of different media frames
when discussing environmental issues have had varying results. Frames that are expected
to be responsive to conservatives, such as religious morality and economic efficiency,
have not been shown to affect a change in support for environmental issues (Severson
and Coleman, 2015). Through the process of this review, I have yet to find any
experiments that test the effects of a national security frame on environmental
perceptions, therefore this research will contribute to theory on media framing and
attitudes on the environment. A significant change in the perception of climate change
among traditionally conservative demographics would represent a large impact of the
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security frame, because these are the groups that may be the most skeptical in terms of
the environment.
National Security Framing and Public Opinion
Research into the importance that national security implications have on voter
attitudes has shown a steady increase in support for policies that mitigate the risks of a
negative national security impact. Globalization, international uncertainty and greater
interconnectedness give national security issues a greater importance in the minds of
voters more so now than in the past (Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, & Sharp, 1989;
Brooks, Dodson, & Hotchkiss, 2010; Smith, 1996). Moreover, individuals tend to rally
around politicians, and their policies, in times where the risks of adverse effects to
national security are high (Brooks et al 2010; Mueller 1970). For example, in the 2008
general election, national security issues relating to defense spending, terrorism, and the
Iraq war had a substantial influence on voting behavior (Brooks et al 2010). In general,
conservative individuals tend to assign greater importance in national security issues and
conservative politicians and media outlets are more likely to emphasize stories with a
strong frame of national security (Konisky et al, 2008). This conservative focus on
national security suggests such a frame on climate change may affect their perceptions on
the issues.
As previously noted, media outlets have an economic advantage in producing
news stories that focus on negative frames that invoke fear in the consumer. Framing
news stories in terms of national security provides politicians greater access to the media,
and thus to voters; as media outlets are more inclined to report such stories (Brooks, et al
2010). Based on this increased focus on national security and the preferential treatment
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given by media outlets, I can reasonably expect that when framing environmental issues
in terms of the adverse risk to national security, the public will be more supportive of the
mitigating policies. However, there must first be a clear link between pro-environmental
policies and reducing the risk of negative national security issues.
Environment as National Security
Viewing environmental policies in terms of national security is a relatively new
practice for researchers, politicians, the media and the public. It was not until the late
20th century that researchers began to examine the potential for environmentally
escalated violence and the greater possibility of international conflicts such as resource
wars over oil, natural gas, water, etc. (Gleick, 1991; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Matthew,
2000). By the early twenty-first century, the magnitude and implications of humangenerated environmental change have had significant influences on the theory and
practice of national security (Matthew, 2000). Scholars and national security experts have
since been drawing a clearer connection between environment and security. Research has
found that environmental degradation poses a direct threat to national security, putting
lives, national welfare and emergency preparedness in danger (Levy, 1995). By drawing
this clear connection in the media frames on environmental policy, this thesis expects to
find that participants in my survey experiment on the effects of framing will rely on this
connection, or heuristic, when determining their attitudes of such policies, leading to
increased attention on the policy agenda.
Issue Frames in Agenda Setting
Another key objective of this project was to examine the policy implications of
issue framing. If framing theory suggests frames can affect individual’s perception of
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reality, theories born out of policy studies may shed light on how frames affect policy
decisions. The literature on agenda setting in the public policy process places a heavy
emphasis on the narrative, or frame, of the public policy problem. Framing the basic
underlining nature of the problem plays a strong role in determining the level of public
attention and action (Rochefort & Cobb, 1993). Rochefort and Cobb (1993) break down
the nature of a problem into five concepts: Severity, Incidence, Novelty, Proximity, and
Crisis. Framing climate change with a narrative of its national security implications
allows the nature of the problem to fit neatly within these concepts. If raising sea levels,
for example, are framed as threats to military readiness the public may perceive this
particular implication of climate change as more severe, possibly even a crisis. Aside for
the nature of the problem itself, Rochefort and Cobb (1993) also placed emphasis on the
nature of the solution as any potential solution must be achievable. A security frame on
the nature of the problem may force a shift in framing the potential solutions to climate
change’s impacts. Solutions framed to be a protection of military infrastructure may be
viewed by the public as more achievable, thereby raising public support.
A potential problem for environmental advocates in framing climate change as a
severe threat is that there is no singular “villain” to assign blame. When looking to assign
blame to problems that may seem out of government’s control, causal stories that portray
risk, such as a national security risk, present a strong strategic advantage for policy actors
to move issues from the accident realm to the realm of purpose, either as an intentional or
inadvertent cause (Merry, 2014; Stone, 1989). Rather than being viewed as a force
majeure, this shift in the causal narrative allows policy actors to tackle a public problem
that previously seemed unachievable.
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Framing issues in a way that promotes the severity of the problem may raise
public awareness, however awareness does not always lead to meaningful change.
Specific to climate change and the environment, Downs (1972) argues that mass media
coverage of environmental issues reinforces the cyclical patterns of the Issue Attention
Cycle. This cycle is characterized by five stages: (1) a pre-problem stage that leads to (2)
a period of alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm when (3) the public realizes the
cost of progress which leads to (4) a gradual decline of interest and ends in the (5) postproblem stage where public attention has diminished, however incremental policy
changes have been spurred (Downs, 1972). McComas and Shanahan (1999) tracked
environmental media frames through each stage of the issue attention cycle and found
that a narrative of consequences and danger dominated the early stages of the cycle, but
then gave way to other frames, economic and scientific, as the environmental issues
progressed through the attention cycle (McComas & Shanahan, 1999). However, Downs’
framework was published well before the media and policy actors began linking the
threats of climate change with direct risks to national security and this strategy of
“problem surfing” (Boscarino, 2009) may provide for greater opportunities to advocates
of environmental policies to control the public agenda. Boscarino (2009) finds evidence
that when advocacy groups prefer a specific solution they will attach it to different
problems as alternative problems gain public awareness. A strategy of framing climate
change as national security may provide advocacy groups and politicians additional sets
of problems to attach their preferred policy action.
The review of the literature in this chapter lays the theoretical foundation for this
thesis. To answer the question of whether a national security frame affects people’s
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perception of climate change, I rely on the theories developed in the issue framing and
media literature to build the basis for the first hypothesis this thesis seeks to test:

Hypothesis 1: When presented with the treatment frame of national security,
survey participants are more likely to agree with statements in
support of climate change as an issue of national security.

I also test the effects of a national security frame on individual’s preference for
policy actions. Literature on policy agenda setting suggests that when issues are framed
with severe consequences that demand public action, the public is likely to keep this issue
in the public arena and on the policy agenda. This leads to the second hypothesis of this
thesis:

Hypothesis 2: When presented with the treatment frame of national security
survey participants will increase their level of support for specific
policy choices.

An issue frame that cannot shift perceptions and motivate the public to act has
little use to issue messengers. However, as prior research suggests, framing an issue such
as climate change as a matter of national security is predicted in this thesis to change
public views of climate change and increase support of specific policy options.
Secondary tests will be conducted to see if the impact of any framing effects on subsets
of survey experiment participants. Before proceeding to the design and methods of this

12

study, the following chapter reports descriptive statistics on environmental public opinion
captured in the 2016 American National Election Study. These data, along with study
findings reviewed in this chapter provide a good indication of how certain demographics
will be affected by national security treatment frame.
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CHAPTER III
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Aside from the literature on demographics of environmental advocates and critics
reviewed in Chapter II, I also present this brief chapter that looks specifically at
environmental public opinion along America’s political divisions. I use data from the
American National Election Studies (ANES) 2016 Time Series Study to analyze public
opinion on environmental issues based on both political ideology and party identification.
The first public opinion variable measured respondents’ view on whether the federal
budget spending on the environment should be increased, decreased, or kept the same.
The following variable measured participant’s opinion on business regulation as a
method of protecting the environment and creating jobs. On a seven-point scale,
respondents were asked to place themselves between 1. “Regulate business to protect the
environment and create jobs,” and 7. “No regulations because it will not work and cost
jobs”. In tables 3.1 through 3.4 I show the frequency and percentage for both political
ideology and party identification on the public opinion variables.
Throughout this chapter each table reports a highly significant chi-square statistic
showing that there is no independence between political and environmental variables.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report the public opinion frequencies among political ideology and
party identification as it relates to federal budget spending on the environment. These
tables present a clear indication that liberals and Democrats are far more supportive of
14

increases in environmental spending. Nearly 65% if Democrats believe federal
environmental spending should either increase or be kept the same. This number
increases over 99% when respondents identify as extremely liberal. Independents showed
similar support as Democrats, with less than 12% believing spending should be
decreased.

Table 3.1
Federal Budget Spending: Protecting the Environment, by
Party ID
Democrat
N=1,446

Republican
N=1,224

Independent
N=1,356

1. Increase

1,050
40.61%

371
30.31%

730
53.83%

2. Decrease

48
3.32%

335
27.37%

159
11.73%

348
518
24.07%
42.32%
Pearson’s Chi-Square = 579.28, p < 0.001

467
34.44%

3. Kept the
same

Opinions on environmental spending do not share nearly the same support among
conservatives and Republicans. Nearly 70% of Republicans would prefer a decrease or
no change in environmental spending, with over 50% of extremely conservative
respondents believe spending should be decreased. Even those less extreme, who identify
as slightly conservative and conservative, support decreased spending at higher rates than
independents and all liberals.
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Table 3.2
Federal Budget Spending: Protecting the Environment, by Political Ideology
Extremely
liberal
N=146
1.
Increase
2.
Decrease

Liberal

Moderate

N=502

Slightly
liberal
N=380

Conservative

N=891

Slightly
conservative
N=506

N=699

Extremely
Conservative
N=165

134
91.78%

413
82.27%

265
69.74%

521
58.47%

210
41.50%

141
20.17%

37
22.42%

1
0.68%

8
1.59%

13
3.42%

60
6.73%

97
19.17%

244
34.91%

84
50.91%

3. Kept
11
81
102
the same
7.53%
16.14% 26.84%
Pearson’s Chi-Square = 926.62, p < 0.001

310
34.79%

199
39.33%

314
44.92%

44
26.67%

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report the frequencies on the 7-point environment-jobs tradeoff
scale that measures respondents’ opinion on regulating businesses to protect the
environment and create jobs. Similar to the descriptive statistics in tables 3.1 and 3.2,
support for business regulation is divided along political and party lines. A large majority
of Democrats are at the top one-third of the scale, with over 75% expressing support for
regulating business to protect the environment and create jobs. Respondents who identify
as slightly to extremely liberal are just as supportive. Less than 1% in each liberal
category believe that there should be no regulations because they do not work and cost
jobs. While still relatively supportive, independents are clustered more toward the middle
of the scale, with nearly 50% in the middle one-third.
Again, conservatives and Republicans reported the lowest levels of support for
business regulation. Only 10% of Republicans support regulation at the highest level,
whereas over 40% place themselves at the bottom one-third of the scale believing
16

regulations do not work and cost jobs. By ideology, no conservative category reached
15% for the highest level of support for regulations. Slightly to extremely conservative
respondents each report strong majorities at bottom half of the scale.

Table 3.3
7pt Scale Environmental-Jobs Tradeoff, by Party ID
Democrat
N=1,215

Republican
N=1,033

Independent
N=1,131

473

110

262

38.93%

10.65%

23.17

274
22.55%

97
9.39%

216
19.10

3.

184
15.14%

151
14.62%

211
18.66

4.

175

235

228

14.40%

22.75%

20.16

5.

52
4.28%

175
16.94%

102
9.02

6.

32
2.63%

165
15.97%

94
5.66

7. No
25
100
regulations
2.06%
9.68%
because it will
not work and
cost jobs.
Pearson’s Chi-Square = 564.92, p < 0.001

48
4.24

1. Regulate
business to
protect the
environment
and create
jobs
2.

17

Table 3.4
7pt Scale Environmental-Jobs Tradeoff, by Political Ideology
Extremely
liberal
N=138

Liberal

Moderate

N=469

Slightly
liberal
N=348

N=766

Slightly
conservative
N=466

Conserv
ative
N=632

1. Regulate
business to
protect the
environment
and create
jobs

112
81.16%

215
45.84%

2.

14
10.14%

3.

104
29.89%

173
22.58%

65
14.57%

54
8.54

21
14.29%

141
30.06%

106
30.46%

139
18.15%

64
14.35%

42
6.65

6
4.08%

3
2.17%

68
14.50%

80
22.99%

137
17.89%

82
18.39%

72
11.39%

14
9.52%

4.

5
3.62%

25
5.33%

39
11.21%

190
24.80%

111
24.89%

151
23.89%

24
16.33%

5.

0
0.00%

11
2.35%

12
3.45%

63
8.22%

72
16.14%

120
18.99%

20
13.61%

6.

3
2.17%

6
1.28%

4
1.15%

35
4.57%

33
7.40%

128
20.25%

36
24.49%

1

3

3

29

19

65

26

0.72%

0.64%

0.86%

3.79%

4.26%

10.28%

17.69%

7. No
regulations
because it will
not work and
cost jobs.

Pearson’s Chi-Square = 1.1e+03, p < 0.001
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Extremely
Conservative
N=147

This overview of public opinion relating to environmental issues provides
supplemental demographic data to the literature reviewed in Chapter III. Through the
ANES data, I am able to build certain assumptions on how participant’s political ideology
may affect the survey experiment of this thesis. Tables 3.1 through 3.4 have demonstrated
that public opinion on environmental issues, such as climate change, are dependent on
one’s political ideology and political party affiliation. Measuring solely political
ideology, I expect this study to find a similar lack of support among conservatives for the
climate change and environmental variables used. However, it may be possible that the
national security frame in this experiment may boost this support, and if so may produce
some of the most significant findings of this thesis.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN

To answer the central research question of this thesis posed in Chapter I and to
test the hypotheses of this thesis, an original survey experiment was designed using an
online labor force, yielding a large N subject pool with a randomized treatment design.
First, this chapter discusses the use of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (“MTURK”) and how
crowd-sourced “workers” from MTURK were recruited as survey participants. Next, I
discuss the design of the experiment, the national security frame, and how survey
experiments have become an effective method throughout the social sciences. Finally, I
describe the design and deployment of the survey experiment using the digital platform
Qualtrics and how the survey is linked to MTURK for experiment participation. This
chapter concludes with a discussion on the use of online labor markets for social science
research and the merits of a digital workforce and opt-in survey participation.
Amazon Mechanical Turk
The survey-experiment was conducted through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(“MTURK”) online crowdsourcing labor platform. MTURK recruits workers to preform
Human Intelligence Tasks (“HITs”) set up by “Requestors” who offer a reward for the
completion of unique tasks. Since MTURK’s launch in 2005, it has become the most
widely used crowdsourced labor market with citations in over 15,000 published papers
over the last 10 years (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016). This popularity is likely a result of
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MTURK’s low cost, easy use, and requiring no interaction between researcher and
subjects, or among fellow subjects. This lack of interaction between the researcher and
subject may prevent any biases or interference than may corrupt the data through inperson experiments. Furthermore, research has shown similar findings when replicating
published, traditional experiments using only MTURK to recruit experiment participants
(Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012).
The nature of MTURK as an online, opt-in labor market to gather convenience
samples does, however, present challenges for researchers. Unless a researcher, or
“requestor” pays premium rates for MTURK “Masters”, gathering high quality data is out
of the control of the researcher. However, research into the demographic makeup of
MTURK workers finds that workers have very similar demographics to traditional
subject pools, which may provide evidence of generalizability in MTRUK experiments
(Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). However, MTURK workers have been found to
be less representative of the US population than internet-based panels or national
probability samples (Berinsky et al, 2012). When researchers measure and account for
political and demographic data, as I do in this study, MTURK has been shown to produce
adequate data for advanced experimental research (Levay, Freese, & Druckman, 2016).
Additional research suggests external validity by finding similar results when survey
experiments are conducted on both MTRUK and through traditional methods (Berinsky
et al, 2012; Mullinix, Leeper, & Druckman, 2015). With the rapid growth in popularity as
a proper research tool, I am confident MTURK will provide data adequate for this study.
MTURK organizes Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) in workers’ task queue
based on preferences such as time, reward, and number of tasks. For this experiment,
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workers were presented with a short description of the study, the “reward”, or payment,
and the maximum time a worker must complete the HIT, see below:
TITLE:
“Answer a survey about your opinions on climate change.”
DESCRIPTION:
“Read a brief news excerpt and give us your opinion about climate change.”
REWARD PER ASSIGNMENT
“$0.50”
TIME ALLOTTED PER ASSIGNMENT
“10 Minutes”
The study was set up to allow exactly 800 unique workers to accept the HIT for a
maximum of 21 days before the HIT would automatically expire.2 Additional keywords
of “survey,” “demographics,” and “research” were provided to help Workers search for
the HIT. MTURK offers the option to request additional qualification of Workers based
on a series of demographics and behaviors or require that all Workers be certified as
“Masters”, a certification that analyzes Workers performance across a wide range of
HITs, however selecting these options increases the fee paid to Amazon. In order to keep
this study economically feasible, no special qualifications were requested, making the
HIT available to all Worker on the platform.3 After reading the description, Workers
could choose to accept the HIT, which would then direct them to a link containing the

As a Requestor, I was required to prepay the entire reward per assignment ($0.50 x 800 Workers), along
with 20% fee paid to Amazon for each unique HIT ($0.20 x 800 HITs. Due to Worker error, 15 additional
surveys, outside of the 800 Workers requested and prepaid, were completed and recorded without the
worker officially accepting the HIT in MTURK, therefore 15 workers were left unpaid for their
participation.
3
This study was awarded a graduate research grant form the University of Louisville Department of
Political Science to cover a bulk of the MTURK expense.
2
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survey-experiment. Upon completion, Workers were given a randomly generated number
to enter into MTURK signaling the completion of the HIT.
Framing Experiment
The survey experiment began by asking participants to read a brief excerpt from a
news article. From there, participants were randomly selected to receive either the control
or treatment article. The groups received an excerpt from a real article TIME Magazine’s
website, TIME.com, by authors Justin Worland and David Johnson from March 2016
titled “See How Your City May Be Affected by Rising Sea Levels.” The control group
received the first three paragraphs of the article verbatim, with no added frame. The
original story does present a loss frame, which is evident in the excerpt received by the
control group, however the loss is general with no mention of national security
implications.
For the treatment group, I first added a reference to national security directly in
the headline. Neither the control nor treatment excerpt contained any source
documentation, such as author or publication, as to against any unwanted effect source
cues may present. However, Therefore, adding a framing element in the headline
received by the treatment group may provide an additional framing effect. The excerpt
received by the treatment group included changes in keywords in the body of the text that
add a national security frame. Specifically, changes to the original story were made to
terms that describe the general population and replaced with terms describing military
installations and personnel. Both control and treatment excerpts can be found in the
Appendix. Once participants finished reading their randomly assigned excerpt, they were
asked to rank their agreement to a series of statements on the relationship between
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climate change and national security, and potential policy actions. The following section
describes the aspects of the survey instrument, the design, flow, and deployment in
further detail.
The use of human subjects in this experiment required approval from the
University of Louisville Institutional Review Board.4
Qualtrics Survey
The survey experiment was designed using Qualtrics online statistical software
platform. Qualtrics survey software was launched in 2002 and allows for personalized
survey design, external survey link that is scalable for most digital platforms, participant
recruitment, and data analytics (Qualtrics.com). The survey was designed using a series
of statement and/or question blocks presented individually to the participants.
Participants had access to both “previous” and “next” page commands in the event of a
mistake or to refer back to any point in the survey. After advancing from the first block,
which obtained the participants consent to participate in the study, participants are asked
to read a brief excerpt from a news article prior to advancing to the survey questions. The
following block contained both the control and treatment news excerpt, randomized so
that an even number of participants were distributed to groups corresponding to the
excerpt they received. Following this randomized block, participants completed the
survey by first responding to statements that measure both their attitude toward climate
change as national security (“Climate-Security”) and their support for specific policy

The Chair of the University of Louisville Institutional Review Board approved this study through the
Expedited Review Procedure since this uses a survey method of data collection, which falls under Category
7 of 45 CFR 40,110(b). This study was also approved through 45 CFR 46.116 (C), which waives the
requirement of a signed consent for the use of human subjects. The consent statement can be found with the
entire survey instrument in the Appendix.
4
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options (“Policy-Action”). The survey concludes with a block that captures participants
self-reported demographic information. Once completed, a final block is presented that
displays a disclosure statement which explains the purpose of the survey and the framing
method used. Also included in this final block is a random and anonymous four-digit
identifier that participants entered into MTURK in order to prove survey completion, as
this code is only available once the participant advances to the final block and release the
payment once the submission was approved.
With the survey designed in Qualtrics and linked with MTRUK, the experiment
was launched to all U.S. based MTURK “Workers”. The following chapter, Chapter V,
reports the demographic distribution among randomized groups, discusses the
measurements used to test the hypotheses predicted in this thesis, and displays a series of
statistical models that test the effects of a national security frame on climate change
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CHAPTER V
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

This chapter reports the distribution of demographics between the control and
treatment groups and tests the hypotheses described in Chapter II. Surprisingly, within
one hour of posting the survey link to MTURK, 815 unique Workers had completed the
HIT, which provides further proof to the rapid expansion of online labor markets. When
researching the validity of MTURK as a social science tool, Paolacci et al (2010) waited
nearly three weeks to obtain roughly one thousand survey participants. Once the HIT
reached 800 completions it was removed from MTURK and the results were recorded on
the Qualtrics platform.
Once all the completed surveys were recorded in Qualtrics, the data were recoded
to give each response a numeric value. The first level of analysis was to compare the
distribution of the participants demographic information across both experimental groups
by cross-tabulating each demographic by group. The Pearson’s chi-square statistics were
calculated to test for independence between categorized variables. The first in a series of
bar graphs, Figure 1 displays the distribution of self-identified political ideology among
both the control and treatment groups.
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Figure 5.1
Distribution of Political Ideology between Experiment Groups.

Political Ideology
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

Extremely
Liberal

Liberal

Slightly
Liberal

Moderate

Slightly
Extremely
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative

Control

43

113

61

82

40

56

13

Treatment

60

111

58

72

35

51

20

Control

Treatment

Pearson’s Chi-Square = 5.59, p = 0.47
Figure 1 shows only a slight variation in distribution between the randomized
experimental groups, however, the Pearson’s Chi-Square has a p value greater than 0.05,
which shows very little significant dependence between participation in either experiment
group and one’s self-identified political ideology. This lack of significance in the ChiSquare statistic shows no difference in the assignment to either experiment group based
on a participant’s political ideology. That is, a participant identifying as “Slightly
Conservative”, for example, had no impact on whether they fell into either the Control or
Treatment group. Next, Figure 2 presents the distribution of Gender between the Control
and Treatment groups.
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Figure 5.2
Distribution of Gender between Experiment Groups.

Gender
300
250
200
150
100
50

0

Male

Female

Missing

Control

252

153

3

Treatment

239

168

0

Control

Treatment

Chi-square = 1.04, p = 0.31

Again, a cross-tabulation and calculation of the Pearson’s Chi-Square on Gender
and Experiment group shows only a slight variation among groups and a Chi-Square
statistic well within the range to assume the variables are independent of one another.
A p value of 0.31 is high enough to determine that there is no significant difference in
the distribution of Gender among the Treatment and Control groups and both males
and females had no difference in opportunity for representation in each group.
Continuing along on demographics, Figure 3 presents the distribution of Age by
Experiment group.

28

Figure 3.
Distribution of Age between Experiment Groups.

Age
250

200
150
100
50
0

18-24

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65+

Control

37

208

91

38

22

12

Treatment

42

205

76

41

30

13

Control

Treatment

Pearson’s Chi-Square = 3.07, p = 0.68

The younger skew should not come as much surprise, given the very nature of online
labor markets such as MTURK (Paolacci, et al 2010). While skewing young, the ChiSquare statistics shows that Age played no significant determining factor in the makeup
of the experimental groups Next, Figure 4 presents the distribution of Race among
experiment groups.
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Figure 4.
Distribution of Race between Experiment Groups.

Race
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

White

Black or
African
American

American
Indian or
Alaskan
Native

Asian

Native
Hawaiian
or Pacific
Islander

Other

Control

254

46

11

93

0

4

Treatment

255

36

12

93

1

10

Control

Treatment

Pearson’s Chi-Square = 4.84, p = 0.44

Figure 4 displays an appropriate distribution and confirms independence between
participants’ Race and randomized experiment group and a Pearson’s Chi-Square statistic
well within the range to reject the Chi-Square hypothesis. Race and Experiment group are
independent of one another and the p value indicates Race had no significant bearing on
assignment to either the Control or Treatment group. Finally, Figure 5 presents the
distribution of Education
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Figure 5.
Distribution of Education between Experiment Groups.

Education
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

High School or
equivalent

Bachelors

Masters or
higher

Missing

Control

102

241

62

3

Treatment

107

230

69

1

Control

Treatment

Pearson’s Chi-Square = 0.075, p = 0.69

As the demographic charts indicate, there is no statistical difference in the distribution
of participant demographics among the control and treatment groups. Each crosstabulation of demographics by experiment group has a p value that far exceeds the .05
level, which allows for the rejection of the Chi-Square hypothesis that the variables were
dependent upon on another. While the overall survey population skews younger, more
educated, liberal, and white, the distributions between the control and treatment groups
did not significantly differ and these demographics played no significant role in
determining selection into either group
To test the hypotheses of this thesis, the survey is designed measure participants’
perception of climate change as a matter of national security, as well support for specific
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policy actions, depending on the framing of an article the participants randomly received.
Both areas, referred to as Climate-Security and Policy-Action, were measured within the
same survey question block, in no particular order. Participants were asked to rank their
level of agreement on a standard seven-point Likert scale (i.e. 1 Strongly Agree to 7
Strongly Disagree). Both areas were measured using three questions:

Climate change as national Security (“Climate-Security”):
Statement 1: “Climate change is a direct threat to national security.”
Statement 2: “Rising sea-levels pose a severe risk to military readiness.”
Statement 3: “Combating climate change is an effective way to improve
national security.”

Support for Policy Action (“Policy-Action”):
Statement 1: “The U.S. Government should invest more to reverse the
adverse effect of climate change by raising taxes on
wealthy individuals.”
Statement 2: “Enacting environmental policies, such as renewable
energy programs and ‘green’ infrastructure improvements,
should be a government priority.”
Statement 3: “Policymakers should consider placing a ‘carbon tax’ on
carbon-emitting industries.”
.
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With an encouraging distribution of demographic data and Pearson’s Chi-Square
showing independence among demographic variables and experiment groups, t-test
analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses laid out in Chapter I. The null hypothesis
of Hypothesis 1 predicts that the national security frame will make no significant
difference on participants’ perception of climate change as national security. To reject the
null hypothesis, a t-test must show that there is a statistically significant difference
between the mean of the Control Group and the mean of the Treatment Group. T-tests
were conducted on each Climate-Security variable individually, with a final t-test
conducted on a Climate-Security Index generated from combining the Climate-Security
variables. Results of this t-test are reported in Table 5.1.
The results of Table 5.1 allow for the rejection of the null hypothesis of
Hypothesis 1 and confirms, that when presented with the treatment frame of national
security, survey participants are more likely to agree with statements in support of
climate change as an issue of national security. Each of the three variables represent
affirmative statements on climate change as an issue of national security. Although both
groups were relatively supportive of the Climate-Security variables, the survey
participants in the treatment groups received the national security frame and showed
higher support for each of the three Climate-Security variables. Also, when indexed, the
treatment group had a difference of means of +1.26, significant at p < .001.
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Table 5.1
Results of t-test and Descriptive Statistics for Climate-Security, by Experiment Group
Climate-Security
Control Group
Treatment Group
M

SD

N

M

SD

n

T

Rising sea-levels
pose a severe risk
to military
readiness.

5.19

1.53

407

5.69

1.29

407 -5.09***

Climate change is
a direct threat to
national security.

5.06

1.67

408

5.45

1.53

406 -3.51***

Combating climate
change is an
effective way to
improve national
security.

4.93

1.67

408

5.29

1.55

406 -3.29***

Climate-Security
Index

15.18

4.37

407

16.44

3.88

406 -4.36***

* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed
The second hypothesis of this thesis predicted that participants given the
treatment frame would be more likely to agree with policy options presented in the
statements that make up the Policy-Action variable group. Just as with Hypothesis 1, a ttest was conducted to reject that null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in
means between the control and treatment groups. The results of this t-test are reported in
Table 5.2 for each of the Policy-Action variables, as well as an indexed variable.
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Table 5.2
Results of t-test and Descriptive Statistics for Policy-Action, by Experiment Group.
Policy-Action
Control Group
Treatment Group
M

SD

N

M

SD

N

t

5.12

1.84

408

5.35

1.77

407

-1.83*

Enacting
environmental
policies, such as
renewable energy
programs and
‘green’
infrastructure
improvements,
should be a
government priority.

5.65

1.48

408

5.84

1.38 405

-1.83**

Policymakers should
consider placing a
‘carbon tax’ on
carbon-emitting
industries.

5.36

1.69

408

5.54

1.62 406

-1.52*

Policy-Action Index

16.13

4.31

408

16.74

4.21 404

-2.03**

The U.S.
Government should
invest more to
reverse the adverse
effect of climate
change by raising
taxes on wealthy
individuals.

* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed
Although the treatment frame had a more significant effect on the mean support
for climate as security tested in Hypothesis 1, the results of the Hypothesis 2 t-test are
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significant enough to reject the null hypothesis. Survey participants were given three
policy options and then asked for their level of support. Each Policy-Action variable has
a mean that is significantly higher for the treatment group, who was given the national
security frame, than for those participants in the control group without such a frame.
There results were also confirmed when tested as an index of the variables. The PolicyAction index shows a 0.61 difference in means between the Control and Treatments
groups, statistically significant at p < .05.
With both hypotheses confirmed in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, I conducted
additional statistical models to control for the various demographic data also collected in
the survey. Chapter II of this thesis included a review of the literature into both
environmental and security attitudes that suggest that a security frame may have a larger
effect on certain demographics, such as political ideology, race, and education (Konisky
et al 2008, Severson and Coleman 2015). Table 5.3 presents the results of a t-test for the
difference in means between the Control and Treatment groups on an index of both the
Climate-Security and Policy Action variables when controlling for political ideology.
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Table 5.3
Results of t-tests and Descriptive Statistics Climate-Security and Policy-Action, by
Experiment Group, controlled for Political Ideology.
Climate-Security Index & Policy-Action Index
Liberal
M

SD

Conservative
N

M

SD

N

Climate-Security
Index
Control
Treatment

16.24 3.44***
17.79 2.62***

217
228

12.64
14.35

5.38**
4.95**

109
106

Policy-Action
Index
Control
Treatment

17.77
18.5

217
226

13.01
13.82

5.46
5.20

109
106

2.76**
2.64**

* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed
Political ideology was measured in the survey on a seven-point scale ranging from
1 – “Extremely Liberal” to 7 – “Extremely Conservative”. This variable was later
categorized into two groups and survey participants that responded with “Moderate,
Middle of the Road” were omitted from this t-test. The national security frame had a
significant effect on both liberal and conservative participants on the Climate-Security
perceptions, although this effect was not as strong for the policy options included in the
Policy-Action Index, especially for conservatives. Unsurprisingly, liberals were more
supportive of both the Climate-Security and Policy-Action variables. These findings
show that participants who identify as Slightly to Extremely Conservative, when
presented with a national security frame, are motivated to associated climate change with
issues of national security. The lack of an effect this frame had on Policy-Action among
conservatives is even more telling of their historic disdain for environmental issues. Even
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when presented with the national security frame, conservatives supported policy options
at far lower rates that liberals. However, the use of the word “tax” in two of the three
policy options may have presented an unintended frame, especially for conservatives.
This finding may suggest that conservatives are averse to climate-mitigating policies
when taxes are suggested. Next, Table 5.4 reports the results of a similar t-test that
controls for Gender.

Table 5.4
Results of t-tests and Descriptive Statistics Climate-Security and Policy-Action, by
Experiment Group, controlled for Gender.
Climate-Security Index & Policy-Action Index
Male
M

SD

Female
N

M

SD

N

Climate-Security
Index
Control
Treatment

15.28
16.40

4.57**
4.03**

252
239

15.05
16.49

4.05***
3.67***

152
167

Policy-Action
Index
Control
Treatment

15.81
16.57

4.59*
4.39*

252
537

16.69
16.98

3.79
3.96

153
167

* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed

While the security frame had little significant effect on the Policy-Action
variables, it is significant in both Male and Female support for the Climate-Security
variables. Moreover, these results show a high level of support for the Policy-Action
variables when indexed. This finding supports others that show greater Female support
for the issues surrounding climate change and the environmental overall. The following
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table, Table 5.5, reports the findings of a t-test that controls for Race. Figure 4 shows that
a large majority of participant identified as White, therefore the Race variable has been
categorized into White and Non-White. This is done not only to keep the distribution of
these two categories comparable, but to separate the differing environmental views
between Whites and Non-Whites as the literature (Abramowitz, 1980) suggests.
Table 5.5
Results of t-tests and Descriptive Statistics Climate-Security and Policy-Action, by
Experiment Group, controlled for Race.
Climate-Security Index & Policy-Action Index
White
M

SD

Non-White
N

M

SD

N

Climate-Security
Index
Control
Treatment

14.30
15.93

4.71***
4.39***

254
254

16.63
17.29

3.26**
2.64**

153
152

Policy-Action
Index
Control
Treatment

15.63
16.31

4.89*
4.77*

254
253

16.97
17.46

2.97*
2.93*

154
151

* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed

Table 5.5 shows the national security frame had a much more significant effect on
White survey participants than Non-White, both categories showed an increase in support
for both variable groups when given the treatment. Overall, Non-White participants
agreed more strongly with both the Climate-Security and Policy-Action variables, a
further signal that demographics typically aligned with the Democratic party and liberal
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ideology express stronger support for the environment and mitigating polices. Table 5.6
controls for Age, which has already been shown in Figure 3 to skew younger, with 60%
of participants under 35. Therefore, Age was categorized into two groups, 18 to 34 years
old and 35 years of age or older.
Table 5.6
Results of t-tests and Descriptive Statistics Climate-Security and Policy-Action, by
Experiment Group, controlled for Age.
Climate-Security Index & Policy-Action Index
18-34
M
Climate-Security
Index
Control
Treatment

15.93
17.20

SD

3.68***
3.14***

35+
N

244
247

Policy-Action Index
Control
Treatment

16.75
3.60**
245
17.39
3.32**
245
* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed

M

14.04
15.25
15.20
15.74

SD

N

5.04**
4.57**

163
159

5.07
5.16

163
159

The results in Table 5.6 shows a stronger support among younger participants for
both variable groups, as well as a more significant difference in means when those 18 to
34 years old were presented with the treatment frame. The national security frame had no
significant effect on support for the Policy-Action variables for participants 35 years of
age or older. The final t-test in this series controls for education, which prior research
would suggest higher support among both variable groups as the level of education
increases.
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Overall, the results of the t-tests presented in Tables 1 through 7 strongly suggests
that the treatment which framed climate change as an issue of national security had a
significant effect on survey participant’s perception of climate change and support for
climate-mitigating policy action. The hypotheses tested in this chapter provide some
explanation to the central research question of this thesis. This chapter concludes by
presenting the results of OLS regression model that reports a coefficient for each control
variable. This multivariate model offers a bit more explanation in the variance of support
for the Climate-Security and Policy-Action variables by controlling for the variables that
office competing explanations for this variance.
Table 5.8 reports these regression findings and shows that group assignment, that
is whether a participant received the original news excerpt or the security framed
treatment, had a positive relationship in determining support for the Climate-Security
variables. Aside from the data reported in Table 5.1, Table 5.8 also affirms Hypothesis 1.
Receiving the treatment frame is associated with a 1.21-point increase in agreement with
the Climate-Security statements. The treatment frame also had a strong significant effect
on the Policy-Action Index. Random selection into the treatment group is associated with
a 0.54 increase for support for the policy options listed in the Policy-Action index. This
finding is consistent with the bivariate results shown in Table 5.2, supporting the
hypothesis that exposure to a nation security frame will increase levels of support for
climate change policies.
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Table 5.7
Results of t-tests and Descriptive Statistics Climate-Security and Policy-Action, by
Experiment Group, controlled for Education.
High School
M
Climate-Security
Index
Control
Treatment
Policy-Action
Index
Control
Treatment

SD

Bachelors
N

M

SD

n

M

Masters
+
SD

n

14.4
0
15.9
1

4.75**
4.15**

102
107

15.17
16.77

4.25***
3.57***

240
230

16.40
16.16

3.94
4.41

62
68

16.09
16.38

4.81
4.57

102
106

16
17.17

4.14***
3.78***

241
230

16.65
15.89

4.20
4.88

62
67

* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed

As suspected, Political Ideology also played a large role in support, or lack
thereof, for both Climate-Security and Policy-Action, independent of group selection. As
participants moved in ideology from the liberal to conservative category, ClimateSecurity saw a 0.89 reduction in agreement to the statements. Furthermore, as the t-test in
Table 5.3 which controlled for Political Ideology showed, participants who identified as
Slightly to Extremely Conservative reported little support for policy actions and shifting
from left to right along the political spectrum is associated with a 1.21 reduction in
support for policies. While these findings are assumed through a review of the literature
into environmental polarization along political lines, significant reductions in support for
policy actions, even when conservative participants are exposed to the national security
frame, demonstrates just how large this divide remains.
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The regression model in Table 5.8 shows Gender with no statistically significant
coefficient for either the Climate-Security or Policy-Action index. Although, as survey
participants moved from Male to Female there is an associated increase in agreement
with the statements of the study, Gender alone was not a significant factor in this
increase. This finding suggests that women, in general, may be more receptive to climatemitigating policies, regardless of how the issue is framed. It is possible that this finding is
a result of women identifying more as a liberal (Abramowitz, 1980; Dunlap & McCright,
2000, 2011), making political ideology the leading factor for their increase in policy
support.
Table 5.8 reports that Age had a significantly negative relationship with both
Climate-Security and Policy-Action as the age of the participant increased. Agreement on
the Climate-Security statements decreased by 0.38 as age increased. Similarly, agreement
among the policy options in the Policy-Action index decreased by 0.48. There are likely
many factors which may explain why younger participants show stronger support for
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Table 5.8
Results of OLS Regression Model on Support for Climate-Security and Policy-Action by
Control Variables.

Climate-Security Index

Policy-Action Index

Coef.
(SE)

Coef.
(SE)

-0.89***
(0.08)
0.17
(0.27)

-1.22***
(0.07)
0.29
(0.27)

-0.48***
(0.12)

-0.38***
(.11)

1.27***
(0.28)
0.41**
(0.21)

0.75**
(0.28)
0.00
(0.20)

1.21***
(0.26)

0.54**
(0.26)

Constant

18.50
(0.85)

20.84
(0.79)

Adj R2

0.22

0.28

Political
Gender
Age
Race
Education
Group

** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001. N = 807
Climate-Security and Policy-Action, but the primary difference, as with Gender,
may be in their political ideology. As political parties are becoming more divided among
age, the more liberal young population may be more reliable supporters of traditional
Democratic Party issues. Younger participants will likely have to endure the more severe
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effects of climate change for many years to come, which may also be a contributing
factor in their support.
Survey participants who self-identified as Non-White also reported a statistically
significant increase in support for both Climate-Security and Policy-Action. Similar to
Age and Gender, political ideology does seem to be a factor on Race, as being a NonWhite participant in this study was associated with an increase of 1.27 and 0.75 in
support for Climate-Security and Policy-Action, respectively. As Whites are more
aligned with conservative ideology and the Republican Party (Abramowitz, 1980; Dunlap
& McCright, 2000, 2011) their decreases in support to the statements in this study over
Non-Whites is not surprising. However, the finding in Table 5.5 may suggest that
receiving the national security frame may be the primary cause of any increased support
among White participants.
Finally, participants’ level of education had a significant positive regression
coefficient for the Climate-Security Index while having also no relationship to the PolicyAction Index. As the level of participant education increased, their support for the
Climate-Security statements increased by 0.41. Education may be best summarized by
the results in Table 5.7, showing not only insignificant difference in means between the
control and treatment groups along Policy-Action, but an actual slight decrease in policy
support when receiving the national security frame. As a participant’s level of education
increased, the security frame had no significant effect on the support for policy options,
although it should be noted that participants with higher levels of education responded
more supportively overall of the Policy-Action statements.
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The findings in Chapter V presented positive results from a large-N sample of
online respondents to the central research question and hypotheses this thesis seeks out to
test. Aside from the typical demographic skews that are expected in online labor markets,
the distribution of demographics between the Control and Treatment groups proved
adequate for comparison and a Chi-Square analysis confirmed independence among the
variables. In nearly each T-test conducted, even when controlling for demographic
variables, subjects receiving the national security frame showed a strong and significant
increase in support for both Climate-Security and Policy-Action statements. In the
conclusion of this thesis, Chapter VI discusses these findings in greater depth, the ways
this study may impact framing studies, and how the rapid changes in communications and
media may present future challenges to issue framers.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The issues surrounding climate change continue to have a polarizing effect on
many Americans. In this thesis I offer a potential bridge to this divide with a
comprehensive study on how issue frames can shape public opinion, even on divisive
issues. This division also lead me to the central research question presented in the
Introduction: “Will the public perceive issues of climate change differently when they are
framed as threats to national security?” To answer that question, this thesis employs an
experimental survey method to measure the impact that security framing has on
participant’s perception of both climate change and environmental policy options. In this
final chapter, I discuss the findings presented in Chapter V, offer suggestions on the
direction of future research into environment-as-security given the findings of this thesis,
and speculate about how the expansion of social media may present obstacles to issue
framing.
For a national security frame to be successful in altering perceptions on climate
change, the public must first be convinced that issues typically associated with climate
change, rising sea levels in this case, are in fact matters of national security. To test the
first hypothesis, statements that directly tie climate change to national security were
given to survey participants asked to rank their level of agreement. Strong statistical
evidence presented in Chapter V confirms this hypothesis that when presented with the
treatment frame of national security, survey participants are more likely to agree with
statements in support of climate change as an issue of national security. The statistical
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analysis reported in Table 5.1, shows an increased in support for the Climate-Security
statements when participants received the national security news excerpt. Even when
controlling for most demographic variables, the increase among treatment group
participants held steady.
The data and analysis reported in Chapter V tells a very clear story on the current
state of polarization in climate change perceptions. On average, participants selfidentifying as liberal perceive climate change as a matter of national security at a rate that
far exceeds Conservatives. The demographic groups that are typically associated with
these political ideologies present similar results. Young, non-white, and higher educated
respondents all support the Climate-Security statements at greater levels than other
groups. However, as the regression model in Table 5.8 shows, Political Ideology had the
highest negative association with Climate-Policy support. The finding begs the questions
as to what, if any, frame can be applied to climate change that would get Conservatives to
change their perceptions on this issue.
Along with testing the effects of a national security frame on the public
perceptions of climate change, I also sought out to test if such a frame would affect
participants’ support for particular climate mitigating policy options. After all, aside from
an issue frame changing public perceptions, an additional goal of issue framers should be
to foster action in support of their policy goals. Viewing climate change as a threat to
national security alone will not satisfy this goal. Frames should also change perceptions
of what should be done about the issue. To measure this support, participants ranked their
level of agreement to three policy options. I find, that when presented with the national
security frame, participants will increase their level of support for specific policy choices.
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Somewhat surprisingly, participants across both experiment groups were overall
relatively supportive of the Policy-Action variables, although this support was higher
among those who received the treatment frame, as hypothesized.
As with Hypothesis 1, increases in support for policy options was associated with
more than just exposure to the treatment frame. Agreement with the Policy-Action
statements can be viewed in a similar light was Climate-Security. Liberals, and related
demographics such as young people, racial minorities, and those with higher levels of
education showed higher support of policies, regardless of the frame the participant
received. However, Conservatives may be been at an unintended disadvantage in support
for the Policy-Action statements. Conservatives have historically been unmatched in their
anti-tax attitudes (Abramowitz, 1980) and two of the three Policy-Action statements
suggested imposing or raising taxes. With strongly significant findings that a national
security frame increases perceptions that climate change is a matter of national security,
future studies may look at additional policy areas to measure support. Rather than
“Carbon-Tax” policy, conservatives may respond more supportive of a “Carbon-Offset”
or “Tax Incentive” policy. These alternative policies to a “Carbon-Tax” could be applied
to either individuals or corporations and by providing an incentive as opposed to a
punishment, such alternatives may find some conservative support.
By confirming the hypotheses this thesis set out to test, framing climate change as
national security may be a useful tool for media outlets, politicians, and advocacy groups
to use to garner support in areas that traditionally shy away from such perceptions and
policies. The review of media literature in Chapter II provides adequate evidence that
sensational stories increase public attention and provide outlets with more incentive to
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run such stories. It may be hard to find a more sensational media story than one with
national security as the focal point. This is not to say that policy messengers should adopt
media strategies that stoke fear and anxiety in the public realm, and this thesis is not an
endorsement of such a strategy. However, if the effects of climate change do not
currently warrant such a dramatic frame, many indications suggest that they soon will as
storms increase in intensity, drought and famine result in mass migrations, and military
installations are affected by rising seas.
The use of a national security frame in discussing the effects of climate change
may be most beneficial for politicians and issue advocacy groups. Liberals running for
public office in conservative districts can beef up their national security bone fides
without compromising traditional liberal stewardship for the environment. Groups
advocating for environmental causes such as land use or renewable energy may be able to
broaden their pool of supporters by embracing a national security frame, especially in
areas with a heavy military presence which is typically along America’s coasts.
Of course, for a media strategy that frames climate change as an issue of national
security to reach the public at large and change perceptions on climate issues, these
particular frames must find a receptive audience in an overcrowded media landscape. The
vast expansion of media choice available to consumers has not had the effect on
knowledge of political and policy issues some might expect. Regardless of this massive
increase in media choice over the past few decades, political knowledge has remained
constant over the same period of time (Prior, 2005). Rather than the evening news being
the only program available to watch at a given time, hence providing all views with a
singular issue frame, people are now able to selectively expose themselves to consume
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only the media messaging they prefer and frames that reinforce their ideological leanings.
Conversely, this media environment also allows consumers to avoid everything else that
strays away from their policy and policy comfort zone. Research into the public’s media
preferences does not bode well for producers of policy messages. When given the option
to choose, only 5% of people prefer the news over other forms of programming, such as
entertainment, while 34% rank the news at or near the bottom of their preference (Prior,
2005). This preference for entertainment over information should leave little doubt over
the lack of growth in American’s political knowledge and ability for some to respond to
framing effects.
However, recent research does suggest that increased knowledge of policy issues
can be seen in some segments of the public. The high-choice media environment has
shown to increase political knowledge in those that are already knowledgeable but
decreases among those with little knowledge to begin with, thus widening knowledge gap
(Prior, 2005). This decrease among those who already lack knowledge may present one
of the largest challenges to political actors attempting to control their preferred issue
frame as they may be more susceptible to a frame that incites fear and uncertainty than
those who are more in tune to the political environment.
Another factor leading to the increased knowledge gap of political issues as a
result of the high-choice environment is the near elimination of passive learning through
accidental exposure. When people are exposed to political information, even when
accidental, they are able to retain some level of knowledge without having any interest in
the topic (Prior, 2005). When the evening news was the only program on, viewers’ only
option was to watch or turn off the television, but when they do tune in knowledge can be

51

gained. This is no longer the case with hundreds of channels, dozens of social media
platforms, and thousands of websites competing for viewers by offering them the frames
and issues that speak best to the consumer.
Even when people do seek out news and information over other, more popular,
choices such as entertainment, they are often likely to do so through an ideological lens.
As this thesis shows, perception of climate as security and support for climate change
mitigating policies is determined as much by political ideology as the issue frame used in
the experiment. When given the choice of news that either confirms or disagrees with
their point of view, 43% of Americans prefer the source that reaffirms their ideological
views, while only 24% of people actively seek out opposing viewpoints (Gainous &
Wagner, 2014). This phenomenon of selective exposure, as well as selective avoidance,
sorts individuals and groups into information bubbles and echo-chambers, where only the
information that confirms one’s beliefs is consumed. These newly formed information
bubbles and message echo chambers present possibly the greatest problems to issue
framers moving forward, as some media consumers selectively expose themselves only to
particular frames, likely presented through a political lens.
Although issue framers, media outlets, and the like may be at an increasing
disadvantage in proliferating their preferred frame, this thesis makes it clear that issue
frames are still an effective tool messengers can use to change public perception and
foster support for particular policy goals. The survey experiment deployed and the
confirmation of the hypotheses of this thesis suggests a national security frame may be a
stronger tool than other frames when defining the effects of climate change. It is no
stretch of the imagination that issues relating to climate change are issues of national
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security. After all, for a time in the recent past, this frame was the official position at the
highest levels of government. It may take the widespread proliferation of this frame, as
well as an ability to penetrate the information bubbles that are hindering public
knowledge, for any meaningful action on climate change to become law.
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APPENDIX
Control Excerpt:
Millions Along U.S. Coasts Will Be Affected
Study after study has shown that sea-level rise due to climate change will leave
cities on U.S. coasts vulnerable to severe and more frequent flooding. Despite the
warnings, though, Americans continue to live and build in regions likely to be
inundated with water in a matter of decades.
New research published in the journal Nature Climate Change suggests that as
many as 13 million people may live in vulnerable regions along the U.S. coasts by
2100 if sea levels rise by 5.9 feet (1.8 m). That’s three times as many people as
would be affected in the absence of continued coastal development and
anticipated population growth along the sea.
“By their nature populations are always changing,” says study author Matt Hauer,
a demographer at the University of Georgia. “If we don’t have adapted
infrastructure to protect people vulnerable to sea level rise, we could see a
migration that mirrors the Great Migration”—the period in the U.S. during the
20th century when millions of Americans moved to cities in the North.
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Treatment Excerpt: National Security Frame
Millions Along U.S. Coasts Will be Affected, Threatening National Security
Study after study has shown that sea-level rise due to climate change will leave
military instillations on U.S. coasts vulnerable to severe and more frequent
flooding. Despite the warnings, though, America’s military continues to build and
operate in regions likely to be inundated with water in a matter of decades.
New research published in the journal Nature Climate Change suggests that as
many as 13 million people, many of them active-duty service members and their
families scattered across nearly 130 coastal military bases, may live in vulnerable
regions along the U.S. coasts by 2100 if sea levels rise by 5.9 feet (1.8 m). That’s
three times as many military personnel as would be affected in the absence of
continued coastal development and anticipated population growth along the sea.
“By their nature military operations are always changing,” says study author Matt
Hauer, a researcher at the University of Georgia. “If we don’t have adapted
infrastructure to protect the military personnel and equipment vulnerable to sea
level rise, we could see a migration that mirrors the Great Migration”—the period
in the U.S. during the 20th century when millions of Americans moved to cities in
the North.” The effects of such an event may pose an irreversible threat to
military readiness and national security.
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Survey Instrument
Start of Block: Default Question Block
Dear Participant:
You are being invited to participate in a research study by answering questions in the
attached survey about your attitudes toward climate change. This study is conducted by
researchers from the University of Louisville. There are no known risks for your
participation in this research study. The information collected may not benefit you
directly. The information learned in this study may be helpful to others. The information
you provide will contribute to our understanding of climate change attitudes. Your
completed survey will be stored at the University of Louisville, Department of Political
Science. The survey will take approximately 10 minutes time to complete. You will be
credited $0.50 on your MTurk account 2-3 days following completion of the task.
Individuals from the Department of Political Science, the Institutional Review Board
(IRB), the Human Subjects Protection Program Office (HSPPO), and other regulatory
agencies may inspect these records. In all other respects, however, the data will be held in
confidence to the extent permitted by law. Should the data be published, your identity
will not be disclosed.
Taking part in this study is voluntary. By answering survey questions, you agree to take
part in this research study. You do not have to answer any questions that make you
uncomfortable. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to be in this study,
you may stop taking part at any time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you stop
taking part at any time, you will not lose any benefits for which you may qualify.
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research study, please
contact: Dr. Jason Gainous at 502-852-1660 or jason.gainous@louisville.edu. If you have
any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may call the Human Subjects
Protection Program Office at (502) 852-5188. You can discuss any questions about your
rights as a research subject, in private, with a member of the Institutional Review Board
(IRB). You may also call this number if you have other questions about the research, and
you cannot reach the research staff, or want to talk to someone else. The IRB is an
independent committee made up of people from the University community, staff of the
institutions, as well as people from the community not connected with these institutions.
The IRB has reviewed this research study.
If you have concerns or complaints about the research or research staff and you do not
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wish to give your name, you may call 1-877-852-1167. This is a 24-hour hot line
answered by people who do not work at the University of Louisville.
End of Block: Default Question Block
Start of Block: Block 5
Please read the following brief news excerpt before proceeding the survey questions.
End of Block: Block 5
Start of Block: Block 2
*Questions in this block were randomized to present only one of the elements below.
These elements were evenly presented to participants.
Millions Along U.S. Coasts Will Be Affected
Study after study has shown that sea-level rise due to climate change will leave cities on
U.S. coasts vulnerable to severe and more frequent flooding. Despite the warnings,
though, Americans continue to live and build in regions likely to be inundated with water
in a matter of decades.
New research published in the journal Nature Climate Change suggests that as many as
13 million people may live in vulnerable regions along the U.S. coasts by 2100 if sea
levels rise by 5.9 feet (1.8 m). That’s three times as many people as would be affected in
the absence of continued coastal development and anticipated population growth along
the sea.
“By their nature populations are always changing,” says study author Matt Hauer, a
demographer at the University of Georgia. “If we don’t have adapted infrastructure to
protect people vulnerable to sea level rise, we could see a migration that mirrors the Great
Migration”—the period in the U.S. during the 20th century when millions of Americans
moved to cities in the North

Millions Along U.S. Coasts Will be Affected, Threatening National Security
Study after study has shown that sea-level rise due to climate change will leave military
installations on U.S. coasts vulnerable to severe and more frequent flooding. Despite the
warnings, though, America’s military continues to build and operate in regions likely to
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be inundated with water in a matter of decades.
New research published in the journal Nature Climate Change suggests that as many as
13 million people, many of them active-duty service members and their families scattered
across nearly 130 coastal military bases, may live in vulnerable regions along the U.S.
coasts by 2100 if sea levels rise by 5.9 feet (1.8 m). That’s three times as many military
personnel as would be affected in the absence of continued coastal development and
anticipated population growth along the sea.
“By their nature military operations are always changing,” says study author Matt Hauer,
a researcher at the University of Georgia. “If we don’t have adapted infrastructure to
protect the military personnel and equipment vulnerable to sea level rise, we could see a
migration that mirrors the Great Migration”—the period in the U.S. during the 20th
century when millions of Americans moved to cities in the North.” The effects of such an
event may pose an irreversible threat to military readiness and national security.
End of Block: Block 2
Start of Block: Block 3
Please read the following statements and select the option that best matches your attitudes toward
climate change.

Rising sea-levels pose a severe risk to military readiness.

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
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The U.S. government should invest more to reverse the adverse effects of climate change by raising taxes
on wealthy individuals.

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

Climate change is a direct threat to U.S. national security.

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
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Enacting environmental policies, such as renewable energy programs and “green” infrastructure
improvements, should be a government priority.

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

Combating climate change is an effective way to improve national security.

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
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Policy makers should consider placing a “carbon tax” on carbon-emitting industries.

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

End of Block: Block 3
Start of Block: Block 4
Finally, please select the demographic information that best describes you.

Political Ideology

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Extremely Liberal
Liberal
Slightly Liberal
Moderate, Middle of Road
Slightly Conservative
Conservative
Extremely Conservative
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Gender

o
o

Male
Female

Age

o
o
o
o
o
o

18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+

Race/Ethnicity

o
o
o
o
o
o

White
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Other
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Highest Level of Education

o
o
o

High school graduate, diploma, or the equivalent
Bachelors degree
Masters degree or higher

End of Block: Block 4
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